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How NOT To READ RORTY
David E. leBoeuf
University of Massachusetts. Amherst
One often hears talk that contemporary philosophy, in the most
general sense, is broadly divided into two rather adversarial camps
that of the "analytic" tradition and that of the "Continental" tradition.
The former termusually refers to those philosophers concerned with
logical analysis and conceptual clarity, philosophers who have inher
ited many of the concerns of the Vienna Circle and who continue to
try and formulate a successful post-positivist epistemology. TIle
latter term usually refers to the more speculative, metanarrative
oriented philosophers such as Heidegger and Foucault, who seek to
radically historicize all human inquiry, particularly Western science
and the various attempts by many philosophers to secure some form
of first-order privilege for such scientific activity.
In recent years, much has been written not only about the split
between analytic and Continental philosophy, but also about closely
related issues such as "modernism versus postmodernism," "objec
tivism versus relativism" and Richard Rorty's schema of
"foundationalism" versus "antifoundationalism,"l but for readers
unfamiliar with the complexities of all these competing schools of
philosophy, and also with the nuances that existinside the logics and
doctrines of each of the major individual thinkers, grouping such a
diverse array of figures and theories under a simple "analytic/
Continental" or "objectivist/relativist" dichotomy can often be more
of a disservice than an elucidation.
As undergraduates becoming initiated into the rich and detailed
history of, for example, epistemology, we are bound at some point to
oversimplify matters. For instance, with regard to how some may
interpret Rorty's wholesale attack upon the epistemological tradi
tion, one undergraduate philosophy instructor has remarked:

LeBoeuf is a s8nior philosophy Imd economics double major altelldil1g the Ulliversity of
Massachusetts at Amherst. A resident afThree Rivers, Massachusetts, lie plans ta pursue
a doctorate in phiIosopTlY.
I See, for instance, Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Hollis und
Lukes; Margolis; and Putnam, Reason, Truth and History.
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Teaching Rorty is difficult. Students respond favor
ably, but superficially, to his critique. They consider
it iconoclastic and exciting, but few of them have had
the time to feel the grip of what he rejects. They may
appreciate in an abstract way that it is unproductive
to do epistemology but few canfeelliberatedby Rorty' s
critique because they have not been captives of
Bernstein's "Cartesian Anxiety" (Prado: d.
Malachowski, pp. 365-6).
Depending on whatever vague and underdeveloped theoretical
orientation we uphold, we may be hasty to stereotype others' theo
ries as "Platonist" or "relativist," or we may hold a set ofbeliefs which
inhlndsight are blatantly inconsistent. It is my belief that much of the
precociousness of our formative undergraduate years can be attrib
uted to our misreadings of (and natural inability to yet adequately
digest) various metanarrative "histories of philosophy"-i.e., those
works which attempt to situate 2000 years of philosophy into a
simple and neat framework. From Nietzsche' s Genealogy ofMorals to
Reichenbach's The Rise ofScientific Philosophy, such texts, when read
by individuals without adequate training in philosophy, are bound
to receive rather perverse interpretations. And it is not just first-year
philosophy undergraduates who are guilty of such interpretations.
If it is, in fact, the case that many philosophy undergraduates engage
in certain types of simplisms at early stages, then for obvious reasons,
the same can be said for individuals in other academic disciplines
who "dabble in philosophy." 2 For instance, the influence of Derrida
in English departments and Kuhn in history departments is quite
significant. My point is not whether some philosophy undergradu
ates are wishy-washy, but rather that we, who have noticed signifi
cant changes in our own philosophical perspectives, use the lessons
we have learned about ourselves to stem similar misinterpretations
by others, especially as certain philosophical doctrines with poten
tially radical consequences gain in popularity amongst individuals
outside of p,rofessional philosophy.3
The eclectic and controversial "pragmatism" of Rorty stands as a
2 See, for instance, Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism; Hollis and
Lukes; Margolis; and Putnam, Reaso1t, Truth and History.
3 I have in mind here underdeveloped interpretations of thinkers such us
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prime example of a metanarrative-oriented philosophy capable of
easy misrepresentation. Cited as anauthoritative philosophical source
by numerous individuals in the humanities and social sciences (but
also scathingly attacked by a multitude throughout academia), Rorty
is arguably the most talked about philosopher in the western world. 4
Since the publication of his landmark book, Philosophy and the Mirror
of Nature, the language of Rorty's subsequent essays has become
increasingly accessible. Rorty's lucid writing style, with his injec
tions of humor and his continual abandonment of technical analytic
terminology, make him increasingly readable, while his ambitious
attempts to synthesize a wide range of writers, both teclmical and
literary, give his call for the end of philosophy a certain authoritative
and rhetorical, if not seductive appeal to many non-philosophers.
It has been noted by Alan Hobbs that:

The Mirror of Nature is designed as an exorcism of
ghosts. For students to profit from the book, their
minds must therefore first be haunted. Without suit
ably muscled ghosts with which to do battle, the
excitement of the exorcism is missing (I-Iobbs: d.
Malachowski, p. 366).
Without "suitably muscled ghosts," the excitement may be missing
but a real danger is quite present-namely, a grossly underdevel
oped (or just plain wrong) interpretation of Rorty and all the unfore
seen consequences that go with it. By briefly examining the core of
Rorty's philosophy and by reflecting upon a few of the prevailing
criticisms of his work, I hope to demonstrate (however indirectly) the
potential that Rorty' s mass appeal may have in inadvertent! y fueling
naive versions of relativism and irrationalism. This concern is com
pounded tremendously, of course, if Rorty's philosophical pOSition
canbe shown to be ultimately incoherent and unworkable, as many
Nietzsche, FOLlC<lult, Heidegger, Denid<l, Kuhn, Rorty and various nea-Marxists.
Though I focus in this paper on the philosophy of Richard Rorty, the S<lme rule of
thumb would <lpply equally well to, for example, Chomsky or cert"in sociobiolo
gists.
4 For <l free-market economist' Stotal embrace of Ror ty' Sphilosophical position,
see McCloskey; for <l similar embrace of Rorty's philosophy by two neo-Marxist
economists, see Resnick and Wolff; for an English professor's complete dismiss" I of
Rorty's view of language, see Steinmann.
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of today's most prominent philosophers maintain.
I

What turned so many heads with the 1979 publication of Philoso

phy and the Mirror a/Nature was the pronouncement, by a very able
philosopher not only trained in the rigors of contemporary analytic
philosophy but also conversant with the major Continental thlnkers
of the day, that philosophy itself, as it has been traditionally con
ceivedof,hadrunits course. As is well known, this is not the first time
that someone had proclaimed the end of philosophy, but what is
striking abou t Rorty is his status of being an "insider" to the technical
arguments of cutting-edge analytic philosophy who is also sympa
thetic to some of the most controversial ideas that have emerged
from the Continental tradition in philosophy. Rorty does not, how
ever, see himself as "taking sides" in either the analytic / Continental
or objectivist/ relativist split. He is equally critical of thinkers onboth
sides of the Atlantic who subscribe to what he sees as an outmoded
philosophicalenterprise-thatof "epistemological foundationalism."
Rorty applies a grid of"foundationalism versus antifoundaticn
alism" to 2000 years of Western philosophy, and he uses this grid to
divide the history 0 f philosophy into those who believe that genuine
foundations to knowledge can, in principle, be discovered or expli
cated, and those who believe that all knowledge (including attempts
to legitima te "genuine" know ledge) is his torically contingent. Under
Rorty's schemata, foundationalism has been, and continues to be, all
the various systematic attempts "to underwrite or debunk claims to
knowledge made by science, morality, art or religion" (PMN, p. 3).
Foundationalist philosophers belieye that by correctly spelling out
the nature of the human mind and its relationship to what is outside
the mind, we canhave knowledge of reality as it exists in and of itself.
Rorty characterizes foundationalist philosophers' main conviction:
To know is to represent accurately what is outside the
mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of
knowledge is to understand the way in which the
mind is able to construct such representations.
Philosophy's central concern is to be a general theory
of representation, a theory which will divide culture
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up into the areas which represent reality well, those
which represent it less well and those which do not
represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing so)
(PMN,p.3).
Such conviction is, according to Rorty, the central tenet that unifies
all foundationalist philosophers-be they analytic or Continental.
One can turn to nearly any page (if not any paragraph) of a Rorty
article and hear the same leitmotif, though perhaps played in differ
ent keys: epistemology-centered philosophy goes back to the Pla
tonic urge to find universals, and though no one still believes in
Platonic ideas, we have nonetheless inherited the idea that true
knowledge can be ascertained-that, in one form or another, lan
guage or the mind acts as a "mirror of nature." Universality, neces
sity, rationality, correspondence theory, representationalism, objec
tivism, cOgnitivism, essentialism, logocentricism, structuralism, re
alism-all these terms (as well as others) are, ifwe are to follow Rorty,
members of the same family, as they all presuppose the feasibility of
the epistemological project.
Wittgenstein, Heideggel' and Dewey are the figures whom Rorty
regards as "the three most important philosophers of our century"
(PMN, p. 7), fOl' each was, in his early years, a foundationaHst
trying to ground knowledge systematically-but in time,
[e]ach of the three came to see his earlier effort as se 1f
deceptive, as an attempt to retain a certain conception
of philosophy after the notions needed to flush out
that conception (the 17th-century notions of knowl
edge and mind) has been discarded ... , Thus their later
work is therapeutic rather than constructive, edifying
rather than systematic, designed to make the reader
question his own motives for philosophizing rather
than to supply him with a new philosophical pro
gram (PMN, pp. 5-6).
II

In an early favorable review of Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror
of Nature, Richard Bernstein notes that some readers of Rorty who
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"may not be acquainted with the latest subtleties" of issues and
arguments in analytic philosophy
may have felt that somehow philosophy tooka wrong
tumwith the analytic movement. Theymay feel some
satisfaction that Rorty has written the type of critique
that could onlybe writtenby an "insider," and that he
has shown that the emperor has no clothes-or at
least is scantily clad. If only Anglo-American phi
losophershad taken a different turn ... then we might
have avoided the tangled mess which has consumed
so much technical competence. But if this is the way
they have read Rorty, then they have misread him and
they have missed the real sting of his critique (PCM,
pp.38-9).
Rorty, after all, is formulating his ideas within the tradition of
analytic philosophy-using the techniques and arguments of ana
lytic philosophers to buttress his metanarrative hopes. (Whether his
moves are valid is, of course, an entirely different issue). Rorty
describes the antLfoundationalist "therapy" he is offering as "para
sitic upon the COllstl'Uctive efforts of the very analytic philosophers
whose frame of reference I am trying to put in question" (PMN, p. 7).
I-Ience, most of ROfty'S particular criticisms of various attempts at
foundationalism 4 are, in a sense, borrowed from various analytic
philosophers such as Quine and Davidson:
I am as much indebted to these philosophers for the
means I employ as I am to Wittgenstein, Heidegger
and Dewey for the ends to which these means are put.
I hope to convince the reader that the dialectic within
analytic philosophy ... needs to be carried a few steps
further. These additional steps will, I think, put us in
a position to criticize the notion of "analytic philoso
phy" and indeed of "philosophy" itself as it has been
understood since the time of Kant (PMN, pp. 7-8).

'For Rorty. the foundationalist urge took its distinctively modern turn with
Locke, Descartes and especially Kant. See "The World Well Lost."
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The question we must ask ourselves is precisely how many
"steps further" we have license to take withoutbecoming incoherent.
Rorty's radical antifounda tionalism leaves absolutely no room what
soever for even a trace of the idea that "the world," in some way and
to some degree, "determines" our knowledge. According to Rorty,
any such hope can only be Kant's "noumena" dressed up inmodem
garb. "If you start out with Kant's epistemology," writes Rorty, "in
short, you will wind up with Kant's transcendental metaphysics"
[WWL, p. 16). Rorty sees Kant's attempt to find apriori principles and
structures (that Kant believed were presupposed for genuine knowl
edge-especially with regard to the success of science) as the imme
diate forerunner of analytic philosophy and the general fmm of its
traditional concern with epistemological foundations. Rorty is pre
pared to classify today's sophisticated versions of scientific realism5
as no more than latent Kantianism, pure and simple. Adopting an
argument of Davidson's, Rorty writes:
All that can be done with the claim that "only the
world determines truth" is to point out the equivoca
tion in the realists' own use of 'world.' In the sense in
which" the w o rid" is just whatever tha t vast majority
of our beliefs not currently in question are currently
thought to be about, there is of course no argument ...
The notion of "the world" as used in a phrase like
"different conceptual schemes carve up the world
differently" must be the notion of something com
pletely unspecified and unspecifiable-the thing-in
itself, in fact (WWL, p. 14).
Hence, everything from the more explicit versions of scientific
realism to Quine's "naturalized epistemology" (which reserves a
special determinate role for stimuli-triggered "observation state
ments") depends ultimately on what amounts to a Kantian defense.
As with most philosophers he chanicterizes as "foundationalist,"
Rorty portrays Quine in a pejorative manner, arguing that
5 For lending defenses of scientific realism, see for instance, the workofRichm:d
Boyd, Larry Laudnn, Ernnn McMullin nnd Clnrk Glymour. Rarty's most direct
address to these and other renUsts is his essay, "Is Natural Science a Natural Kind?"
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other philosophers followed Quine in falling back
into dogmatic metaphysicS, decreeing that the vo
cabulary of the physical sciences "limns the true and
ultimate structure of reality." It is significant that
Quineconc1uded that "the unit of empirical inquiry is
the whole ofscience," when one might have expected,
given the drift of his argument, "the whole of cul
ture." Quine, and many other holists, persisted in the
belief that the science-nonscience distinction some
how cuts culture at a philosophically significant joint
(NS, pp. 46-7).
One can still, however, subscribe to a holism that does regard "the
unit of empirical inquiry" as "the whole of culture" and yet not be

forced to accept Rorty's conclusions. One such holism is that of
Davidson,6 who notes his point of departure from Rorty:
Wherewe differ, ifwe do, is onwhether there remains
a question how, given that we cannot "get outside our
beliefs and our language so as to find some test other
than coherence", we nevertheless can have knowl
edge of, and talk about, an objective public world
which is not of our own making. I think this question
does remain, while I suspect that Rorty doesn't think
so (Davidson, p. 123),
Hilary Putnam's "internal realism," which he backs up with the
notion of a transcendental rationality. is another holistic line we can
take that is very different from Rorty's. As a causal theory of
reference, it is one of the last foreseeable defenses of the very notion
of "reference" (that there is some determinate linkage between "our
world" and "the worId"). Putnam counts Rorty as a "cultural relativ
6 Davidson's philosophy resls heavily on Quine' 5 theoryof meaning. If Qui ne' s
indeterminacy of translation thesis ultimately has no empirical explann tory power
(since different translation manuals, or different "conceptual frameworks," all
square with the stimuli of "the world") then Davidson's argument against "the very
idea of a conceptual scheme" has even less empirical explanatory power, and
consequently (and in a rather paradoxical way) seems to square ever more so with
common-sense realism (ala Tarski). One then wonders how Rorty feels he has the
license to deny (or at least qualify in a very strange way) the primary roles of
"reference" and "truth" and the concept of reason they presuppose (PFD).
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ist" because of Rorty's insistence that convincing one's peers is all
there is to the game of "truth." In the Peircean tradition, Putnam
writes:
What I am saying is that the "standards" accepted by
a culture or a subculture, either explicitly or implic
itly, cannot define what reason is, even in context,
because they presuppose reason (reasonableness) for
their interpretation..., Reason is ... both immanent
(not to be found outside of concrete language games
and institutions) and transcendent (a regulative idea
that we use to criticize the conduct of all activities and
institutions) (Putnam, p. 234).
According to Rorty, using the term "reason" (with its implicit
notionofanidealconvergencepointof"truth")isreallynomorethan
convincing others to accept your assertions-there is no role being
played by "the world," as the term is really just a confusion with
language. Putnam, however, stresses that we cannot appeal to a
consensus definition of reason "because consensus among grown
ups presupposes reason rather than defining it (Putnam, p. 240).
Reason, as Putnam describes it, is normative. ASCribing to it a
transcendentalnalurecan be viewed as a Kantianmove,butsowhat ?
One will only see this as something "bad" if one subscribes to
Rortyism, which (given the ideals, scientific achievements and
"foundationalist" accounts of the Enlightenment) certainly must
bear the burden of proof.
III
This brings us to the issue of whether Rotty is a relativist. But first
we must be eleen' about what we mean by the term "relativist."
In its most ancient form, relativism is Protagoreanism, the self
contl'adidory view that accompanies a s tatement such as, "there is no
truth." How are we to judge sucha statement? For if it were true that
"there is no truth," we would have a reflexive paradox-as there
wouldbe at least one true statement, namely, that "there is no truth."7
7 For a nice introduction to the self-referential problem and discussion of how
it affects the philosophies of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida. see Lawson.
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Responding to anticipated charges that he subscribes to this type of
naive relativism, Rorty writes:
"Relativism" is the view that every belief on a certain
topic or perhaps about any topic. is as good as every
other. No one holds this view. Except for the occa
sional cooperative freshman, one cannot find any
body who says that two incompatible opinions on an
important topic are equally good .... If there were any
relativists, they would, of course, be easy to refute.
One would merely use some variant of the self
referential arguments Socrates used against
Protagoras. But such neat little dialectical strategies
only work against lightly-sketched fictional charac
ters. The relativist who says that we can break ties
among serious and incompatible candidates for be
lief only by "nonrational" or "noncognitive" consid
erations is just one of the Platonist or Kantian
philosopher's imaginary playmates, inhabiting the
same realm of fantasy as the solipsist, the skeptic and
the moral nihilist (PRI, pp. 166-7).
But if naive Protagorean relativism8 is an "imaginary playmate" for
"Platonist or Kantian philosophers," cannot we turn the tables on
Rorty. arguing that "naive Platonism" (as Rorty often seems to
caricature most of Western philosophy) is Rorty's own imaginary
playmate? Charles Taylor writes of the
certain suppositions [that] seem to be made in the
various invocations of [Rorty' s] argument: that the
only candidate for a general account of truth is in
terms of correspondence; that correspondence is to be
understood in a rather simpleminded way. approach
ing at times a picture theory; that believers in the
correspondence theory are Raving Platonists. Under
lying all of this is a continuing imprisonment in the
8 Joseph Margolis warns us that, "relativism should not be construed as, or as
reducible to, any form of skepticism, cynicism, nihilism, irrationalism, anarchism or
the like, although it may be that a well-defended relativism would lend comfort to
doctrines of these sorts" (67).
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model basic to the whole epistemological tradition
which understands thinking in terms of representa
tion.... By Raving Platonism, I mean the view that
Rorty often invokes to ridicule his adversaries, such
as that "the final vocabulary of a future physics will
somehow be Nature's Own," or "that a vocabulary is
somehow already out there in the world." We should
consider this just as a rhetorical flourish. Rorty can't
really believe that hard-faced scientific realists who
think that mechanistic materialism is literally true,
subscribe to Raving Platonism (Taylor, pp. 268-9).
In a similar vein, Richard Bernstein (whose criticisms of Rorty
have become harsher and more pointed over the years) writes:
Why does Rorty think that philosophy (or "Philoso
phy") amounts to little more than the worn-out vo
cabulary of "bad" foundational discourse? So much
of his recent writing falls into the genre of the "God
that failed" discourse. There seems to be something
almost oedipal-a form of patricide-in Rorty's ob
sessive attacks on the father figures of philosophy
and metaphysics (OSF, p. 557).
It certainly does seem that Rorty paints far too much of a human face

on the West's apparent predisposition to engage in epistemological
foundationalism. Rorty is an intellectual historian and, as such, he is
prone to "lay the blame" of our foundationalist urges (if not explic
itly, then implicitly) on Kant, and before him, Descartes, going all the
way back to Plato. 9
Rorty's d1aracterization of how we arrived at our present modes
of scientific and philosophicalinquiry appears much more black and
white than Peirce's "cable versus chain" account of knowledge,
where instead of picturing our reasoning as a linear and isomorphic
"chain" from, say, "facts" to "states-of-affairs-in-the-world," we
instead picture our fallible knowledge, at any given moment, as the
many different types of evidence, modes of argumenta tion, hunches,
9 Cornel West believes tha t Rorty' s "thin historicism rests can ten t with intellec
tual historical narratives and distrusts social historical narratives ... his narrative
needs a more subtle historical and sociological perspective" (West, p. 270).
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etc., that, individually, are only weak strands, but. collectively. form
a strong cable. We never have knowledge that perfectly corresponds
to "the world," but "the world" does guide, in a certain determinate
sense, where our inquiry moves. Of Rorty's caricature of Western
philosophy as being simply a series of illusory "chain" pictures,
Bemstein echoes Taylor:
According to this story. the real villain is Plato-at
least the Plato identified (mythologized) by Platonism
... Iwant to maintain that this narrative is itself rapidly
becoming a blinding prejudice that obscures more
than it illuminates. What was once a stinging critique
is becoming a bland, boring cliche. One begins to
wonderifthereeverwasa "foundationalist"thinker
at least one who fits the description of what Rorty
calls "foundationalism." Even Plato-the Plato of the
Dialogues-fails to fit this description ... Rorty's char
acterization and caricature of the history of philoso
phy is rapidlyrunnmg itself into the ground ... what is
now needed is to demythologize this narrative of the
invidious fallelmess of Platonism. For it is only to the
extent that we still accept some version of Rorty's
mythologizingaboutwhat philosophy and metaphys
ics are, and what "philosophic justification" must be
that his playful skepticism has any sting.... It is time
that Rorty himself should appropriate the lesson of
Peirce, "Do notblock the road to inquiry ..." (OSF, Fp.
558-60).
Bernstein, like Rorty, believes it is time to go "beyond objectivism
and relativism," that for too long we have been suffering from
"Cartesian Anxiety"-Le., the fear that unless we emerge from our
Cartesian skepticism with some kind of secure and objective
Archimedean point for our knowledge, we will be in a state of
epistemological nihilism, having no objective reasons for the beliefs
we hold to be true and perhaps not even knowing what to believe.
Bemstein sees traditional epistemology as offering us a false di
chotomy. a false "Either lOr," to choose from-in which we eithel'
believe in objective and stable bedrock foundations for our knowl
edge, or else everything is relative. But Bernstein sees in Rorty yet
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another grand and equally untenable Either JOr-that of
foundationalism versus antifoundationalism.
It is, after all, only a grid, only one of the many possible ways to
quickly summarize 2000 years of human inquiry. As ametanarrative,
it is hard to see how Rorty's philosophy can escape rela tivism and,
ultimately, a forced position of irrationalism. And, as Steinmann
notes, "the intellectual price of accepting it is far too high, and, worst,
it is incoherent ... Why should we renounce the Enlightenment and
its (still quick) heirs for unspecified benefits" (Steinmann, p. 47)?
Despite the controversies, counterarguments and uncertainties
that surround Rortyism, he seems to be gaining in popularity,
particularly with disciplines outside of professional philosophy and
with the lay public. Any philosophy student who, at one time or
another, found him or herself uncritically swallowing (hook, line and
sinker) a doctrine such as Rorty's (and I count myself as one) must
take it upon him or herself to engage others in exercises that will
sufficiently muscle their ghosts and haunt their minds.
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